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A Note on the Determinants and Consequences of 
Outsourcing Using German Data 
 
Using German data from the Institute for Employment Research Establishment Panel, this 
paper constructs two main measures of outsourcing and examines their determinants and 
consequences for employment. There are some commonalities in the correlates of the two 
measures of outsourcing, as well as agreement on the absence of adverse employment 
effects across all industries. For one specification, however, some negative effects are 
reported for manufacturing industry, balanced by positive effects for the services sector for 
another. But there are no indications of survival bias. This is because the association 
between outsourcing and plant closings is predominantly negative, albeit poorly determined. 
 
 
JEL Classification:  F16, J23 
  






John T. Addison 
Queen’s University Management School 
Queen’s University Belfast 
Belfast BT7 1NN 
Northern Ireland 
United Kingdom 
E-mail: j.addison@qub.ac.uk     
 
                
   2
I.  Introduction 
Research on the correlates and consequences of outsourcing using establishment data is 
uncommon in the literature, which has mostly relied upon industry-level data in discussing the 
phenomenon in an international trade context (see Amiti and Wei, 2005; Feenstra and 
Hanson, 1999; Hijzen et al., 2005).
1 The present paper follows a different tack in deploying 
detailed information on establishment characteristics to examine the determinants of 
outsourcing and its consequences for employment, where the concept of employment is 
widened to include plant survival. Our investigation uses German data from the Institute for 
Employment Research (Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung, or IAB) 
Establishment Panel to construct several measures of outsourcing that are then linked to 
establishment characteristics and employment. 
 
II. Measuring outsourcing at establishment level 
The IAB Establishment Panel was initiated in 1993 (1996 for eastern Germany). It was 
created to meet the needs of the Federal Employment Agency for improved information on 
the demand side of the labor market. It is based on a stratified random sample – the strata are 
for 16 (currently 17) industries, 10 employment-size classes, and 16 regions (the 
Bundesländer) – from the population of all German establishments with at least one employee 
covered by social insurance. To correct for panel mortality, exits, and newly founded units, 
the data are augmented regularly yielding an unbalanced panel. The first wave of the IAB 
panel in 1993 included some 4,265 west German plants, and in 1996 the east German 
establishment panel began with 4,313 plants. Overall, the IAB panel increased in size every 
year up to 2001 when it stabilized at around 16,000 establishments. In 2007, for example, it 
contained information on 15,644 plants, employing some 2.46 million workers. 
                                                  
1 For studies using plant-level data, however, see Görg et al (2008), and Görg and Hanley 
(2004, 2005). 
   3
Data are collected in personal interviews with the owners or senior managers of the 
establishment by professional interviewers. The questions cover the number of employees, the 
qualifications of employees, the number of temporary and agency workers, working hours 
(every second year since 2002), coverage by a collective agreement at industry or firm level, 
establishment sales turnover, the expected development of turnover, the share of sales 
attributed to intermediate inputs and external costs (which we use to construct our first 
measure of outsourcing), export share, total investments (and the shares of that total made up 
of expansion investments and (until 2007) investments in information and communications 
technology), the total wage bill, profit sharing (irregularly in the five surveys since 1998 but 
comparably since 2000), the technological status of the establishment (except in 2004), its 
legal status and corporate form, age, and overall economic performance, reorganization 
measures undertaken and process/product innovations introduced (every third year), and 
company further training activities (every other year). Since 2000 the works council status of 
the plant has been asked every year after an hiatus in the 1990s, and (for 2006 alone) the 
quality of the works council from the perspective of the manager respondent. Further, the 
second outsourcing variable used in the present exercise is taken from a question on major 
organizational change including whether or not the establishment had increased its purchases 
of products/services from outside sources over the course of the preceding two years. This 
question was initiated in 1998 and has been asked every third year from 2001. 
  As we have intimated, the key outsourcing measures contained in the IAB Panel 
pertain to the share of sales attributed to intermediate inputs and external costs (in the year 
preceding the survey)
2 and organizational change over the course of the preceding two years 
                                                  
2 The actual survey question is as follows: “What share of sales was attributed to intermediate 
inputs and external costs [in the previous year], i.e. all raw materials and supplies purchased 
from other businesses and institutions, merchandise, wage work, external services, rents and 
other costs (e.g. advertising and agency expenses, travel costs, commissions, royalties, postal 
charges, insurance premiums, testing costs, consultancy fees, bank charges, contributions to 
chambers of trade and commerce and professional associations)? 
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involving  a greater acquisition of goods and services (i.e. from outside the firm).
3 
Specifically, the former share is converted to an absolute (Euro) value and then expressed as a 
share of value added. (We also experimented with using the answers to this question directly 
and expressing the derived value of externally-sourced inputs as a percentage of the total 
wage bill after Görg and Hanley, 2005. Results of using these other measures are mixed and 
are available from the authors upon request.) We used the value of externally-sourced inputs 
as a share of value added in both levels and differences, while recognizing that changes in the 
ratio need not necessarily represent changes in outsourcing but instead reflect changes in 
either input or output prices – as well as how establishments manage their inventories of 
finished goods.  
Our second measure of outsourcing is in principle unaffected by changes in either 
input or output prices since it merely inquires of the manager respondent whether or not there 
was increased reliance on  bought-in products and services over a two-year interval. This 
measure though innovative has the downside that we do not know the magnitudes in question 
(the degree of outsourcing) merely the directional influence.  
By way of summary, our two broad measures of outsourcing are not without blemish. 
The virtue of the former measure is that we can observe the current level of outsourcing, even 
if we must remain cautious about measured changes in outsourcing derived from differences 
in levels. The second measure allows us to identify outsourcing establishments without 
conveying any information about the extent of the process. Expressed differently, given the 
non-contiguous timing of the surveys, we cannot use information on increased reliance on 
                                                  
3 Readers familiar with the IAB Firm Panel should note that another question in the survey 
(Q2) seemingly offers a more direct measure of outsourcing since it asks whether parts of the 
establishment were closed down or relocated in other company units or hived off and 
operated as separate independent businesses. Unfortunately, there are problems in using this 
question – as well as a separate follow-up insourcing question (Q3) – by virtue of a low 
response rate as well as certain inconsistencies involving the responses of single-plant firms. 
On closer inspection, it emerges that Q2 was never intended to inform on the outsourcing 
question.  
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outsourcing from the organizational change question to identify an acceleration or 
deceleration of outsourcing over time. 
We use a common set of covariates for the determinants and consequences of 
outsourcing. These comprise sales per employee, the share of sales attributable to exports, 
expectations of rising future sales, gross investment, dummies for investment in information 
and communication technology and investment in production facilities, an advanced state of 
technology dummy constructed from a five-element question where the management 
respondent is asked to assess the plant’s overall state of on technology  relative to other 
establishments in the same industry, number of employees, wages per employee, the shares of 
high skilled workers and workers on fixed term contracts, the separation or labor turnover 
rate, works council presence,
4 coverage by a collective agreement at either sectoral or plant 
level, and whether the plant was located in western (as opposed to eastern) Germany. In 
addition, a number of plant characteristics were included, namely, dummies indicating if the 
plant was established before 1990, whether it was a single-establishment firm, and the exact 
legal form of the enterprise.
5 Finally, our regressions include in excess of 30 industry 
dummies, where the exact number depends on the dependent variable. We restricted our 





                                                  
4 Since works councils may only be formed in establishments with at least five permanent 
employees, our sample excludes plants employing fewer than this number of employees.  
 
5  We distinguish between individually-owned firms (the omitted category), partnerships, 
limited liability corporations, companies limited by shares, public corporations/foundations, 
and other legal forms (e.g. cooperatives). 
 
6 We also investigated other time intervals (e.g. 1999-2001). Results are available from the 
authors upon request. 
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Results on the determinants of outsourcing are provided in Tables 1 through 2. Table 1 
presents logit results for the ‘organizational change’ measure, namely, expanded usage of 
bought-in products over the two-year interval ending on June 30, 2004. It is apparent that 
plants with increasing recourse to outsourcing are disproportionately export-led, to have made 
investments in information and communications technology, to have expectations of 
expanded business volume over the course of the current year, and to be located in western 
Germany. They also record higher labor turnover. Outsourcing is also higher in limited 
liability corporations than other legal forms, but single-plant enterprises clearly engage in less 
outsourcing. Despite the importance of investments in information and communications 
technology, there is no indication that the technological status of the plant matters, or that 
mature plants outsource more. On this measure, neither industrial relations institution (viz. 
works councils and collective bargaining coverage) nor workforce characteristics seem to 
influence outsourcing. 
(Tables 1 and 2 near here) 
Material on the other measure of outsourcing is contained in Table 2. The first two 
columns give results for the ratio of externally sourced inputs to value added in levels form 
for 2002 and 2004. The third column presents findings for changes in that ratio between 2002 
and 2004. Beginning with the levels results, the first observation to make is that, with the 
exception of number of employees, no variable is consistently statistically significant. Second, 
while a number of variables achieve statistical significance in either year – examples include 
investments in production facilities, state-of-the-art technology (not surveyed in 2004), 
location in western Germany, share of fixed-term contract workers, and single-firm 
establishments, there are also some sign reversals (e.g. export share in 2004 where the 
coefficient estimate changes from positive and statistically insignificant to negative and 
statistically significant). Third, there are few commonalities with Table 1; for example, 
expectations of higher sales in 2002 and a higher export share in 2004 are now associated   7
with a reduced ratio of externally-sourced inputs to value added. For their part, the results in 
the third column of the table indicate almost no statistically significant determinants of 
(changes in) the outsourcing ratio – and a disappointingly low coefficient of determination. 
The sole exceptions are companies limited by shares and the share of high-skilled employees, 
where the associations are positive and negative, respectively. 
Summarizing our findings with respect to the determinants of outsourcing, there are 
few signs from the evidence on changes in outsourcing at least that the phenomenon is 
associated with reduced sales per employee, technological sluggishness, or low wage firms. 
Although there is some supporting evidence from the analysis in levels of variables (e.g. the 
positive influence of state-of-the-art technology and investments in production facilities), 
there are also some contrary indications (the negative and marginally statistically significant 
coefficient estimate for wages per employee in 2004).  On balance, then, we might have 
expected to draw on more direct evidence than we have uncovered (i.e. beyond the positive 
associations with export share, expected sales, and investments in information and 
communications technology and here only for one of the outsourcing measures). And, 
although outsourcing might be viewed as an alternative form of workforce flexibility, note 
that the inverse association between the share of fixed-term workers and outsourcing was 
never statistically significant in the change in outsourcing equations (only for outsourcing in 
levels for 2002). 
(Table 3 near here) 
What of the consequences of outsourcing? To examine this question our principal 
focus is upon (two-year) changes in employment.  But since employment changes can only be 
observed for survivors, we shall also consider a possible employment effect operating through 
plant closings. Table 3 contains OLS estimates of the effect of outsourcing on the change in 
employment between 2002 and 2004. Column (1) gives results for the organizational change 
measure of outsourcing, column (2) for the ratio of externally-sourced inputs to value added   8
in 2002, and column (3) for the change in this ratio between 2002 and 2004. As is apparent, 
the effects of outsourcing are (marginally) statistically significant only in the case of the last 
specification. As far as the other arguments are concerned, employment change is negatively 
associated with gross investments (albeit insignificantly so) – although the reverse is true for 
the dummies capturing investments in information and communications technology and 
investment in production facilities – and with establishment size, while it is positively 
associated with expectations of increased sales, advanced technology, location in western 
Germany and, interestingly, with the share of fixed-term contract workers.   
(Tables 4 and 5 near here) 
Tables 4 and 5 provide disaggregated results for services and manufacturing, 
respectively. For services, although the outsourcing coefficient estimates are unchanged 
(albeit statistically insignificant) for the ratio measures, we obtain a positive and statistically 
significant coefficient estimate for the organizational change measure of outsourcing. This is 
the first estimate of which we are aware that points to rising employment in association with 
outsourcing in this sector. The influence of the other regressors is broadly as observed for 
industry as a whole.  
The results for manufacturing offer a further twist. Even if the signs are inconsistent, 
we obtain statistically significant coefficient estimates for both the level and the change in the 
ratio of externally-sourced inputs to value added, while the coefficient for the organizational 
change measure is now negative (albeit not statistically significant). The rest of the results are 
also somewhat different from before. For example, neither location in western Germany nor 
the share of workers on fixed-term contracts is statistically significant. Further, the 
employment consequences of mature plants and absence of state-of-the-art technology are 
now transparent: older plants with less up-to-date technology grow less. There is also some 
suggestion that lower wage plants may outsource more.    9
As a final exercise, we sought to determine whether our outsourcing measures had any 
effect on plant closings. Since the latest (publicly) available survey refers to 2006, this 
exercise amounts to examining the effects of outsourcing on plant failures over the interval 
2004-2006. 
 Using the IAB panel we can identify plant closings in the following manner. As of 
2006, we have data on the ‘current’ state of each establishment that participated in 2004. Of 
course not all plants ‘missing’ from the survey in 2006 are deaths: some are plants where the 
interviewer was unable to figure out what had happened to them, while others will simply be 
plants that have been rotated out of the sample. Additional information from the German 
Federal Employment Agency establishment file was then used to check on whether a 2004 
participant was still extant in 2006. The file contains information on each German 
establishment with at least one employee covered by social insurance, and is used to draw the 
sample for the Establishment panel. The establishment identifiers of plants with missing data 
on survival in the panel were compared with the establishment identifiers in the file. A 
missing establishment was adjudged to have failed if no match could be found in the file. 
Alternatively put, former missing observations for which a match was found were added back 
in as survivors. In this way, we were able to obtain virtually complete information on 
survivals/deaths of all plants that were part of the establishment panel in 2004. After all such 
calculations, we arrive at a total of 199 plant failures for all industries as of 2006 for the 
organizational change measure of outsourcing. Corresponding plant failures for the ratio of 
externally-sourced inputs to value added are 185 and 120 for the levels and change measures, 
respectively. 
The probability of failure was modelled using a logistic regression in which the RHS 
variables are identical to those used in the employment change equations. The dependent 
variable is assigned the value of 1 for those plants that failed between 2004 and 2006, 0 
otherwise. All regressors have values set at the time of the 2004 wave.    10
(Table 6 near here) 
The logit results are presented in summary form in Table 6. Beginning with the 
organizational change measure of outsourcing, we see that all the point estimates are negative, 
although none achieves statistical significance at conventional levels. The same results obtain 
for the change in the ratio of externally sourced inputs to value added between 2002 and 2004, 
that is, all coefficients are again negative and insignificant. For the level of externally sourced 
inputs in 2004, however, two out of three coefficient estimates are positive (for all for all 
sectors and for services). The results for manufacturing are opposite in sign but remain 
statistically insignificant. Although one might conclude from this evidence that outsourcing 
might weakly indicate a solution to problems of survivability rather than hinting at a source of 
competitive difficulty, we would instead incline to the view that there is nothing in the data to 




The results of this investigation into outsourcing and its employment consequences are mixed 
and may be summarized as follows. First, the correlates of outsourcing do not hint at any 
obvious pathology in the sense of identifying an unfavorable backdrop to exercises of this 
type. Second, across all industries, there is no convincing evidence that outsourcing costs 
jobs. Third, however, behind this latter result is the appearance of disparate effects for 
services on the one hand and manufacturing on the other, and in each case consistent with the 
aggregate findings these different results derive from different outsourcing measures. The 
disparate results for the two sectors offer sustenance to opponents and supporters of 
outsourcing alike. But if so, it remains rather thin gruel. Finally, it appears that we can reject 
the notion that the employment consequences are either more or less favourable by reason of 
survival bias. That is to say, there are no signs that outsourcing aggravates plant closings.   11
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Table 1: The Determinants of Outsourcing, Organizational Change Measure: Expanded Use 
of Bought-in Products and Services, 2002-2004, Logit Model 
 
Variable Coefficient  (s.e.) 
  
Sales per employee  -4.53e-07 (3.13e-07) 
Export share   0.007 (0.002)*** 
Increasing sales expected   0.284 (0.111)** 
Total of all investments  -4.92e-06 (4.43e-06) 
Investments in ICT   0.377 (0.128)*** 
Investments in production facilities   0.160 (0.129) 
State-of-the-art technology  -0.105 (0.106) 
Number of employees   0.075 (0.052) 
Wages per employee   0.0001 (0.0001) 
Share of high skilled workers   0.260 (0.219) 
Separation rate   0.650 (0.373)* 
Share of fixed-term workers  -0.045 (0.498) 
Works council   0.232 (0.144) 
Collective agreement   -0.069 (0.116) 
Western Germany   0.310 (0.127)** 
Establishment founded before 1990   0.105 (0.118) 
Single-establishment firm  -0.277 (0.117)** 
Partnership   0.216 (0.225) 
Limited liabilitiy corporation   0.296 (0.174)* 
Company limited by shares   0.030 (0.273) 
Public corporation  -0.396 (1.118) 
Other legal form   -0.374 (0.521) 
  
Log likelihood  -1525.1601 
LR Chi-square (d.f.)   370.77 (53)*** 
Pseudo R
2  0.1084 
N   4,504 
  
*, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Robust standard 
errors are in parenthesis. 
Notes: Right-hand side variables are base-year (2002) characteristics. The model also includes 31 
industry dummies. 
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Table 2: The Determinants of Outsourcing, Ratio of Externally-Sourced Inputs to Value 
Added Measure in Levels (2002, 2004) and Changes in Levels (2002-2004), OLS Estimates 
 
Variable (1)  (2)  (3) 
     


































































































































      
R
2 0.07 0.08 0.02 
N 5,027  5,643  3,495 
      
*, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Robust standard 
errors are in parenthesis. 
Notes: See Table 1. The dependent variable in columns (1) and (2) is given by the ratio of externally-
sourced inputs to value added in 2002 and 2004, respectively, and in column (3) by the 2002-2004 
change in the ratio. The right-hand-side variables are measured as of 2002, 2004, and 2002, 
respectively. 
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Variable  (1) (2) (3) 
      





Ratio of externally-sourced inputs to value added, 2002    0.001 
(0.0004) 
 
Change in ratio of externally-sourced inputs to value 
added, 2002-2004 
   -0.001* 
(0.001) 


















































































































































        15
R
2 0.06 0.06 0.07 
N 4,541  4,313  3,495 
      
*, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Robust standard 
errors are in parenthesis. 
Notes: See Table 1.  The model includes 35 industry dummies. 
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Table 4: The Effect of Outsourcing on Employment Change in the Services Sector, 2002-






Variable  (1) (2)  (3) 
      





Ratio of externally-sourced inputs to value added, 2002    0.001 
(0.001) 
 
Change in ratio of externally-sourced inputs to value 
added, 2002-2004 
   -0.001 
(0.0005) 















































































































































(0.036)   17
      
R
2 0.07 0.07  0.06 
N 2,018  1,880  1,493 
      
*, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Robust standard 
errors are in parenthesis.  
Notes: See Table 1. The model includes 18 industry dummies. 
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Table 5: The Effect of Outsourcing on Employment Change in the Manufacturing Sector, 




Variable  (1) (2)  (3) 
      





Ratio of externally-sourced inputs to value added, 2002    0.001* 
(0.001) 
 
Change in ratio of externally-sourced inputs to value 
added, 2002-2004 
   -0.002* 
(0.001) 















































































































































(0.092)   19
      
R
2 0.08 0.08  0.09 
N 2,523  2,433  2,002 
      
*, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Notes: See Table 1. The model includes 17 industry dummies. 
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Outsourcing measure  All industries Manufacturing  Services 
     
Expanded use of bought-in products and services, 2002-
2004 
-0.140 








  (0.477) 
[N= 2,772] 












Change in the ratio of externally-sourced inputs to value 
added, 2002-2004 
-0.004 
  (0.014) 
[N= 3,224] 
-0.008 
  (0.022) 
[N= 1,701] 
-0.002 
  (0.016) 
[N=1,405 ] 
     
*, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Standard errors 
are in parenthesis. 
Note: The fitted equations include the full set of regressors used in the previous tables. 
 